The Role of Regulatory in Price Control and Spectrum Allocation to Competing Wireless Access Networks

Document Type : Research Paper


1 Department of Computer Engineering, Amirkabir Universsity of Technology

2 department of Computer Engineering, Amirkabir Univ. of Technology


With the rapid growth of wireless access networks, various providers offer their services using different technologies such as Wi-Fi, Wimax, 3G, 4G and so on. These networks compete for the scarce wireless spectrum. The spectrum is considered to be a scarce resource moderated by the spectrum allocation regulatory (“regulatory” for short) which is the governance body aiming to maximize the social welfare through moderation of the spectrum allocation table (SAT). In this paper, we present a three stage dynamic game model directed by the regulatory to maximize the clients' welfare. The regulatory controls the proposed prices announced by networks and it determines the tax in proportion to the price and load of each network. The model simulates the behavior of end users, network providers and the regulatory agent through which spectrum allocation strategy is deducted, the rules and parameters are defined, and the system equilibrium in terms of resource allocation and pricing is analyzed. The experimental results show that the proposed spectrum allocation schema results in a situation with the highest clients' welfare and network providers have enough advantages to stay in the market.


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